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Abstract 
This study examines how waste disposal fee collection timing affects the durable goods 
producer’s choice of built-in durability under a monopoly. We categorize the disposal fee 
policies into two types: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. 
We compare an ADF policy with a DF policy using a durable-goods monopoly model. 
This study shows that a DF policy has two opposing effects on built-in durability. Firstly, 
the DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase built-in durability in order to 
delay the households’ disposal and to discount the future payment for the disposal fee. 
Secondly, the DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally to 
avoid the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce built-in durability in 
order to avoid market saturation and associated future price cuts. As a result, on the one 
hand, a DF policy can make the producer produce the more durable product compared 
with an ADF policy; on the other hand, however, a DF policy may increase the amount 
of waste generated, and lead to an additional environmental damage.  
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1. Introduction 
Many developed countries have incorporated extended producer responsibility (EPR) 
policies to address waste disposal and recycling of durable goods. In Japan, for example, 
the Electric Appliance Recycling Law, enacted in 1998, mandates that users pay the 
disposal fee at the point of disposal for used electric home appliances such as refrigerators 
and televisions. On the other hand, according to the Automobile Recycling Law 
promulgated in 2002, users pay the disposal fee at the point of purchase. The former is an 
example of a disposal fee (DF) policy and the latter an advance disposal fee (ADF) policy. 
The directive on Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), which came into 
effect in 2003, requires EU member states to pass a legislation that imposes all recycling 
and waste management costs of WEEE on the producers of products by introducing an 
ADF policy. In 2015, United Nations Member States adopted The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development that includes Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 
members of the UN pledged to accomplish 17 goals by the year 2030. Goal 12 states that 
“Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.” Policies for this goal should 
be embraced to improve resource efficiency, reduce waste, and mainstream sustainability 
practices across all sectors of the economy. 
This study considers how waste disposal fee collection timing affects the durable goods 
producer’s durability choice and subsequently, the environment. We compare an ADF 
policy with a DF policy using a durable-goods monopoly model. From the viewpoint of 
EPR, the producer, rather than the government, has a responsibility for waste pollution 
caused by wasted products. In considering EPR policies, the distinction between durable 
and non-durable goods is crucial because products of higher durability would last longer, 
thereby reducing the amount of waste generated and the associated environmental burden. 
In effect, product durability design is essentially a part of design for the environment 
(DfE).1  
Our interest is to analyze which policy type, ADF or DF, most effectively reduces waste 
and environmental damage in the monopolistic producer case, where incentives exist to 
manufacture less-durable products in order to avoid market saturation and associated 
future price cuts.2 We find that a DF policy has two opposing effects on built-in durability 
                                                   
1 Guiltinan (2009) suggests that planned obsolescence increases the disposal costs of durable goods 
and brings troublesome environmental consequences. 
2 According to Coase (1972), the built-in durability chosen by a durable goods monopolist is socially 
insufficient because of the time-inconsistency problem. Consumers expect the monopolist to face a 
time-inconsistency problem; monopolists lose monopoly power since they have an incentive to sell 
additional units at a lower price in the future. Planned obsolescence is a device used by the monopolist 
to ensure that it does not have to lower the good’s price in the future. Bulow (1986) formalizes Coase’s 
suggestion by using a two-period model. See also Bond and Samuelson (1984), Waldman (1996), 
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that an ADF policy does not have. Under a DF policy, households have the incentive to 
illegally dispose of waste in order to save the payment for waste disposal. This provides 
an incentive for producers to manufacture goods with lower durability so as to avoid 
market saturation and associated future price cuts. Conversely, a DF policy also provides 
an incentive to increase built-in durability in order to delay households’ disposal and to 
discount the future payment of the disposal fee. Thus, a DF policy may make a product 
more durable as compared to an ADF policy; however, a DF policy may also increase the 
amount of waste and lead to illegal dumping with severe negative environmental 
consequences. 
To the best of our knowledge, only Shinkuma (2007) analyzes the optimal waste 
disposal policy for durable goods by comparing a DF policy with an ADF policy. He 
concludes that a DF policy is more desirable because an ADF policy results in excessive 
disposal and the lifetime of durable goods is shorter than the social optimum. Shinkuma 
argues that durability of goods is not under the control of producers; instead, products can 
be repaired at the end of their life and traded in secondhand markets. In this study, we 
take the approach of focusing on the monopolistic producer’s choice of built-in durability, 
rather than consumers’ repairing activity, and reconsider the desirable waste disposal 
policy under these circumstances.  
  While we focus on the relationship between the timing of waste policies and the 
producer’s choice of built-in durability, several researchers partially share a common 
awareness of issues. Regardless of lack of attention on product durability, Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1995) and Fullerton and Wu (1998) argue that an ADF policy is preferable 
because a DF policy results in increased illegal disposal and decreased social welfare.3 
As per Calcott and Walls (2000), a DF policy is undesirable if a recycling market does 
not function properly. These studies deal with the case of non-durable goods and perfect 
competition.  
Another strand of research examines emissions taxation issues in durable goods 
industries. Boyce and Goering (1997) demonstrate that the optimal pollution tax may 
exceed marginal environmental damage under a monopoly seller of durable goods with 
increasing returns to scale in production and exogenous product durability. Eichner and 
Runkel (2003) analyze the efficiency-restoring tax-subsidy schemes considering a 
                                                   
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Kinokuni (1999), and Kinokuni et al. (2010). Waldman (2003) provides a 
comprehensive survey of the theory of durable goods. 
3 The issue of illegal dumping is extensively treated in the existing literature. OECD (2001) mentions 
that a DF policy could increase illegal disposal of waste. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) offer 
evidence that a DF policy leads to illegal dumping. See also Copeland (1991), Aalbers and Vollebergh 
(2006), and Kirakozian (2016). 
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relationship between durability and recyclability. Runkel (2003) shows that producers of 
durable goods have an incentive to delay waste under perfect and imperfect competition. 
Runkel (2002, 2004) shows that, in a model of a durable goods monopoly with 
endogenous product durability and constant returns to scale in production, an increase in 
waste tax enhances product durability and the optimal waste tax is above the marginal 
environmental damage.4 These studies do not compare economic effects between an 
ADF policy and a DF policy.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a two-period 
model of a durable goods monopoly, wherein the household is required to pay the disposal 
fee under an ADF policy or a DF policy. Section 3 shows that a DF policy gives the 
household an incentive for illegal dumping and that the household’s actual payment for 
waste disposal under a DF policy differs from under an ADF policy. Section 4 derives 
the equilibrium. Section 5 compares the two policies from the viewpoint of the 
environment. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Basic assumptions 
We extend the two-period model for a durable goods monopoly developed by Bulow 
(1986) to analyze the effect of disposal fee policies on the behavior of a durable goods 
producer. In our two-period model with durable goods and a numeraire good, the 
economy is composed of a monopolistic producer, a continuum of identical households 
with total mass normalized to one, and a local government including a solid waste 
management (SWM) sector.  
In each period, the durable goods producer chooses the amount of the new goods, 
denoted by 𝑞୧ (𝑖 = 1, 2 ). The producer also chooses the built-in durability in period 1, 
denoted by 𝐷 ∈ [0,1]. Built-in durability 𝐷 represents the probability that the goods 
supplied in period 1 will operate in period 2. That is, a portion of the goods produced in 
period 1, (1 − 𝐷) 𝑞ଵ, is broken at the end of period 1. Thus, the market stock in period 
𝑖 is 
      𝑄ଵ =  𝑞ଵ, 𝑄ଶ =  𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ. 
With no loss of generality, we assume there are no production costs. To simplify our 
analysis, we assume that the fixed cost and marginal cost are zero and the producer can 
                                                   
4 Kinokuni et al. (2019) reinterpret Runkel’s result in the framework of a DF policy and compare the 
equilibrium of the closed-loop model with that of the open-loop model. Other studies that consider 
taxation in durable goods industries include Goering and Boyce (1996, 1999), Goel and Hsieh (1999, 
2004) and Eichner and Runkel (2005). 
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choose the durability level without incurring any cost.  
At the end of the service life, the used durable goods turn into waste. The SWM sector 
collects and disposes of the solid waste. Costs for collecting and disposing of the waste 
are financed by the disposal fee imposed on the household. The disposal process makes 
no profit, that is, it is a non-profit sector. We also assume that the SWM sector has a linear 
technology for SWM services. The exogenous disposal cost per unit is denoted by 𝜏.5 
We investigate two kinds of disposal fee policies: an ADF policy and a DF policy. In 
the former, the household has to pay the disposal fee at the time of purchasing new goods. 
In the latter case, the household has to pay the fee at the time of discarding the end-of-life 
goods. Under an ADF policy, there is a time lag between collecting fees and waste 
disposal. Any disposal fees collected at the beginning of the first period for units unbroken 
at the end of that period are carried over to the second period. In our model, we assume 
that the collected fees, which are factored into the product pricing, are immediately 
transferred to the SWM sector and the interest income which unused fees yield is refunded 
to the household at the beginning of the second period. 
Under a DF policy, the household has an incentive to illegally dump the end-of-life 
goods in order to avoid paying the disposal fee. We assume that illegal dumping can be 
detected by a local government, and the ratio of being accused of illegal dumping is 𝜌
[0,1] . The fine levied for the crime is denoted by 𝐹, and is collected with the detection 
of illegal dumping. 
Identical households live for two periods. The representative household consumes a 
numeraire good and service flows of the durable goods. It is assumed that the amount of 
service flows consumed is equal to the stock the household possesses. Denoting 
consumption of the numeraire good in period i (𝑖 = 1, 2 ) by 𝑥୧ and consumption of 
service flows of the durable goods in period i by 𝑄௜, the household’s per-period utility 
function in period i, 𝑢௜, is assumed to be given by 
      𝑢௜ = 𝑥௜ + 𝑄௜ ቀ𝑎 −
ொ೔
ଶ
ቁ , 𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑎 > 0.                           (1) 
The household gains lump-sum income I at the beginning of the first period. The 
household’s budget constraint in period 1 is 
                                                   
5 The Electric Appliance Recycling Law of Japan and the Automobile Recycling Law of Japan states 
that the disposal fees shall not exceed the appropriate cost of efficiently implementing activities 
required for recycling. For example, the disposal cost for a refrigerator is around ¥5,000, that for a 
liquid crystal television is around ¥3,400, and that for an ordinary vehicle is around ¥10,000-¥18,000 
in Japan. These are set by producers. 
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      𝐼 = 𝑥ଵ + 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ + 𝑆 + 𝑞ଵ𝑇ଵ஺஽ி,                                      (2) 
under an ADF policy and 
𝐼 = 𝑥ଵ + 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ + 𝑆 + (1 − 𝐷)𝑞ଵ𝑇ଵ஽ி,      (3)     
under an DF policy. The household’s budget constraint in period 2 is 
      𝑅 ∙ 𝑆 + (𝑅 − 1)𝐷𝑞ଵ𝑇ଵ஺஽ி = 𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + 𝑞ଶ𝑇ଶ஺஽ி.                      (4) 
under an ADF policy and 
      𝑅 ∙ 𝑆 = 𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)𝑇ଶ஽ி.                                (5) 
under an DF policy. In (2) - (5), 𝑞୧ denotes the amount of the durable goods purchased 
in period i, 𝑝୧ denotes the sales price of the goods in period i, S denotes savings, and 
𝑅 > 1 denotes the gross interest rate. The household’s unit cost for waste disposal in 
period i is denoted by 𝑇௜, which differs depending on the type of disposal fee policy. 
Under an ADF policy, the timing between collecting fees and the expenditure of them is 
different. Unused fees in period 1 bear interest in period 2. In (4), the income gain from 
remaining fees is assumed to be refunded to the household in order to close this economy 
model. 
Fig. 1 about here 
The chronology of the game is as follows (see Fig. 1). The first period contains stages 
1 and 2. In stage 1, the producer chooses its first-period output level of new goods and 
the built-in durability to maximize overall profit. In stage 2, the household chooses its 
first-period consumption of the numeraire and new goods to maximize its lifetime utility, 
subject to its lifetime budget constraint. At the end of the first period, the household 
discards the end-of-life goods and the SWM sector collects and disposes of the legally 
collected waste. Under a DF policy, some of the end-of-life goods are illegally dumped 
and not collected by the SWM sector. If the illegal disposal is detected, the local 
government levies a fine. The second period contains stages 3 and 4. In stage 3, the 
producer chooses its second-period output level to maximize second-period profit. In 
stage 4, the household chooses its second-period consumption of the numeraire and new 
durable goods to maximize its second-period utility, subject to its second-period budget 
constraints. As before, at the end of the second period, the household discards the end-of-
life goods, the SWM sector collects and disposes of the waste. Under a DF policy, some 
of the end-of-life goods are illegally dumped, and if detected, the local government levies 
a fine. 
This is a game of complete information. Our model adopts the closed-loop strategies, 
that is, the producer is unable to pre-commit to future decisions. Therefore, the solution 
satisfies the properties of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.  
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3. Disposal fee and advance disposal fee 
We examine the difference in the household’s costs for waste disposal under an ADF 
policy and a DF policy. We have assumed that the SWM sector does not benefit from the 
disposal process.  
Under an ADF policy, the household pays the disposal fee, which equals the marginal 
disposal cost, at the time of purchase of goods. Therefore, under an ADF policy, the 
household’s unit cost for waste disposal in period i is 
     𝑇௜஺஽ி = τ ≡ 𝑇
஺஽ி , 𝑖 =  1, 2.                                   (6) 
The SWM sector disposes of the collected waste with the disposal fee transferred from 
the producer.  
Under a DF policy, the household pays the disposal fee at the time of discarding the 
waste good. The SWM sector disposes of the legally collected waste. We assume that the 
detection probability of any illegal dumping is 𝜌 [0,1] , the fine levied for that crime is 
𝐹 and 𝜃௜  is the ratio of legally collected units to total discarded units. The household’s 
unit cost for waste disposal is 
      𝑇௜஽ி = 𝜏𝜃௜ + 𝜌(1 − 𝜃௜)𝐹, 𝑖 =  1, 2.                             (7) 
If households engage in more frequent illegal dumping, the detection probability of 
the unlawful activity rises. Thus, we suppose that 𝜌 is a decreasing function of 𝜃௜, and 
is given as follows: 
      𝜌 ≡ 1 − 𝜃௜ , 𝑖 =  1, 2 .                                        (8) 
The household determines the ratio of illegal disposal. Substituting (8) into (7) and 
minimizing 𝑇௜ with respect to 𝜃௜ yields 
      𝜃௜ = 1 −
ఛ
ଶி
≡ 𝜃෠, 𝑖 =  1, 2.                                       (9) 
Our analysis is assumed to restrict the interior solution6. In (9), it means that a reduction 
in the disposal fee, associated with a decrease in the marginal disposal cost, would 
increase the number of households that legally dispose of end-of-life goods through the 
SWM sector. An increase in the fine for illegal dumping would have the same effect.7 
                                                   
6 We will discuss conditions of the interior solution of the equilibrium in the end of Section 4. 
7 While (9) implies that illegal dumping cannot be completely prevented unless an infinite fine is 
imposed, we exclude the case of the infinite fine. Becker (1968), which is a seminal study on the 
economics of crime, claims that maximum fine should be imposed because a severe punishment deters 
crime and the fine is a costless transfer. However, a considerable study has attempted to show that 
extremely heavy penalties may not be socially optimal. For example, Ehrlich (1982) considers the 
possibility of a legal error and discusses justice as equality under the law; this study suggests a less 
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Substituting (8) and (9) into (7), the cost for waste disposal paid by the household in 
period i under a DF policy is 
      𝑇௜஽ி = 𝜏 ቀ1 −
ఛ
ସி
ቁ ≡ 𝑇஽ி , 𝑖 = 1, 2.                                 (10) 
An increase in the disposal fee 𝜏 has two opposing effects on the household’s cost for 
waste disposal. On the one hand, it reduces disposal costs for those households that 
choose to illegal dump their waste in order to avoid the higher fee; on the other hand, it 
increases disposal costs for households that choose to pay the higher fee for legal disposal. 
From (10), the expected household’s payment 𝑇௜஽ி is an increasing function of the 
disposal fee for 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏̅ and reaches the maximum 𝜏/2 when 𝜏 = 𝜏̅. Thus, we have the 
following result. 
 
Lemma 1. A DF policy reduces the household’s expected payment for waste disposal 
compared to an ADF policy, that is, 𝑇஽ி < 𝑇஺஽ி . 
 
Under a DF policy, the household that discards the end-of-life goods has two options: 
paying the regular disposal fee or illegally dumping and incurring the expected cost of 
the penalty. Therefore, the household’s expected payment for waste disposal under a DF 
policy is lower than that under an ADF policy. 
 
4. The equilibrium 
4.1. The equilibrium under an ADF policy 
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium of durable-goods monopoly under an 
ADF policy. The game is solved by backward induction.8 We focus on optimization 
problems of the household and the producer.  
In stage 4, the household’s maximization problem under an ADF policy is, from (1)  
and (4), 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥௫మ,௤మ  𝑢ଶ  
s.t. 𝑅 ∙ 𝑆 + (1 − 𝑅)𝐷𝑞ଵ𝑇஺஽ி = 𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + 𝑞ଶ𝑇஺஽ி. 
Under an ADF policy, the income gain from the remaining fees is assumed to be refunded 
to the household. The first-order conditions for the household’s maximization yield the 
inverse demand function of the second-period new goods: 
      𝑝ଶ = 𝑎 − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ) − 𝑇஺஽ி ≡ 𝑝ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ).                     (11) 
                                                   
than maximum fine as the optimal law enforcement. Garoupa (1997) provides a survey on the theory 
of optimal law enforcement. 
8 The details of the solution are in Appendix. 
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In stage 3, the second-period maximization problem for the monopolistic producer is 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௤మ𝜋ଶ = 𝑝ଶ
஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ)𝑞ଶ. 
The maximization of this problem yields the following reaction function: 
      𝑞ଶ =
௔ି஽௤భି்ಲವಷ
ଶ
≡ 𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷).                                  (12) 
(12) states that the second-period quantity is a decreasing function in the remaining stock 
𝐷𝑞ଵ. 
In stage 2, the household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to the lifetime budget 
constraint. Assuming a perfect financial market, that is, 𝛿 = 1/𝑅 , the household’s 
maximization problem is denoted as, from (1), (2) and (4), 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௫భ,௤భ  𝑢ଵ + 𝛿𝑢ଶ                                                  
     s.t. 𝐼 = 𝑥ଵ + 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଵ𝑇஺஽ி + 𝛿(𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + 𝑞ଶ𝑇஺஽ி).   
The maximization for the household yields the inverse demand function of the first-period 
goods as follows: 
      𝑝ଵ = 𝑎 − 𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝐷{𝑎 − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)} − 𝑇஺஽ி ≡ 𝑝ଵ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ).         (13) 
In stage 1, the monopolistic producer chooses not only 𝑞ଵ  but also D, which 
maximizes its overall profit anticipating the producer’s second-period decision given by 
(12). Therefore, the producer’s maximization problem is denoted as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௤భ,஽ 𝑝ଵ
஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ)𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝑝ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ)𝑞ଶ.  
s.t. 𝑞ଶ = 𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷). 
From the producer’s maximization problem, we obtain the following equilibrium: 
        𝑞ଵ஺஽ி =
௔ି்ಲವಷ
ଶ
, 𝑞ଶ஺஽ி =
௔ିଷ்ಲವಷ
ଶ
 and 𝐷஺஽ி = ସ்
ಲವಷ
௔ି்ಲವಷ
.              (14) 
When 𝑇஺஽ி = 𝜏 = 0, 𝐷஺஽ி = 0, that is, the monopolistic producer practices planned 
obsolescence.9 An increased disposal fee decreases the household’s willingness to pay 
for the durable product due to the increased waste cost. Therefore, a rise in the disposal 
fee reduces each period’s output. This gives the producer an incentive to enhance built-in 
durability since increased durability replaces the output reduction.  
 
4.2. The equilibrium under an DF policy 
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium of durable-goods monopoly under an DF 
policy. In stage 4, the household’s maximization problem under a DF policy is, (1) and 
(5), 
                                                   
9  In a seminal study, Coase (1972) shows that a durable-goods monopolist faces the time-
inconsistency problem, wherein ex post decisions hurt its overall profitability. Low durability is a 
device to commit, not to overproduce. 
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             𝑚𝑎𝑥௫మ,௤మ  𝑢ଶ   
s.t. 𝑅 ∙ 𝑆 = 𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)𝑇஽ி.        
The first-order conditions for the household’s maximization yield the inverse demand 
function of the second-period new goods: 
      𝑝ଶ = 𝑎 − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ) − 𝑇஽ி ≡ 𝑝ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ).                       (15) 
In stage 3, the second-period maximization problem for the monopolistic producer is 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௤మ𝜋ଶ = 𝑝ଶ
஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ)𝑞ଶ. 
The maximization problem yields the following reaction function: 
      𝑞ଶ =
௔ି஽௤భି்ವಷ
ଶ
≡ 𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷).                                    (16) 
In stage 2, the household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to the lifetime budget 
constraint. Assuming a perfect financial market, that is, 𝛿 = 1/𝑅 , the household’s 
maximization problem is denoted as, from (1), (3) and (5), 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௫భ,௤భ  𝑢ଵ + 𝛿𝑢ଶ                                                  
      s.t. 𝐼 = 𝑥ଵ + 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ + (1 − 𝐷)𝑞ଵ𝑇஽ி + 𝛿{𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)𝑇஽ி}. 
The maximization for the household yields the inverse demand function of the first-period 
goods as follows: 
      𝑝ଵ = 𝑎 − 𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝐷{𝑎 − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)} 
−(1 − 𝐷)𝑇஽ி − 𝛿𝐷𝑇஽ி ≡ 𝑝ଵ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ).                      (17) 
In stage 1, the monopolistic producer chooses not only 𝑞ଵ  but also D, which 
maximizes its overall profit anticipating the producer’s second-period decision given by 
(16). Therefore, the producer’s maximization problem is denoted as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௤భ,஽ 𝑝ଵ
஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ)𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝑝ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷, 𝑞ଶ)𝑞ଶ  
s.t. 𝑞ଶ = 𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷). 
From the producer’s maximization problem, we obtain the following equilibrium: 
         𝑞ଵ஽ி =
௔ି்ವಷ
ଶ
, 𝑞ଶ஽ி =
ଵ
ଶ
ቄ𝑎 − ቀ1 + ଶ
ఋ
ቁ 𝑇஽ிቅ  and 𝐷஽ி =  ସ்
ವಷ
ఋ(௔ି்ವಷ)
.    (18) 
  Here, we discuss the interior solution conditions. The interior solution condition of the 
ADF equilibrium (14) is τ ≤ 𝑎/5 and that of the DF equilibrium (18) is 𝐹 < ఋ௔
ସାఋ
. From 
(9), 𝜏 < 2𝐹 ≡ 𝜏̅ guarantees that the fine for illegal dumping is effective. In order to 
reduce the case classification, we assume that 𝜏̅ = 2𝐹 < 𝑎/5 . These conditions are 
summarized as follows: 
      த
ଶ
< 𝐹 < min ቄ𝐹ത, ௔
ଵ଴
ቅ.                                            (19) 
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5. Comparison of waste disposal policies 
This section examines how the timing of disposal fee collection affects the producer’s 
built-in durability choice. We compare the equilibrium built-in durability under a DF 
policy with that under an ADF policy. 
 
Proposition 1. When 0 < 𝛿 ≤ (𝑎 − 2𝐹)/2(𝑎 − 𝐹), the equilibrium built-in durability 
under a DF policy is always higher than that under an ADF policy. When 
(𝑎 − 2𝐹)/2(𝑎 − 𝐹) < 𝛿 ≤ 1 , the equilibrium built-in durability under a DF policy is 
higher than that under an ADF policy for the small disposal fee, and lower than that under 
an ADF policy for the large disposal fee. 
 
  A DF policy has two opposing effects on built-in durability that an ADF policy does 
not have. Firstly, under a DF policy, the monopolistic producer of durable goods has an 
incentive to increase built-in durability in order to delay the household’s disposal and to 
discount the future payment for the disposal fee. We call this effect the “payment-
discounting effect.” Thus, a decrease in the discount factor raises built-in durability under 
a DF policy. Secondly, under a DF policy, the existence of illegal dumping leads to a 
reduction in built-in durability. Under a DF policy, the household has an incentive to 
illegally dump the end-of-life goods with intent to decrease the expected payments for 
disposal. This incentive makes the producer lower the price and expand production, 
resulting in reducing the built-in durability in order to prevent a major decline in the 
product’s second-period price. We call this reduction of the built-in durability the “illegal-
dumping effect.” 
Fig. 2 about here 
  Fig. 2 shows the result of proposition 1. If the discount factor is small, 𝐷஽ி > 𝐷஺஽ி 
since the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect. If the discount 
factor is large, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect when 
the disposal fee is small. Only when the discount factor is large and the disposal fee is 
large, 𝐷஽ி < 𝐷஺஽ி  holds. In Fig. 2, two opposing effects are balanced out on the 
boundary line 𝜏 ෞ, which is derived in Appendix. 
From the viewpoint of the producer’s profitability, we compare an ADF policy with 
an DF policy. Both the payment-discounting effect and the illegal-dumping effect have 
positive impacts on the producer’s profit. Under a DF policy, the producer has an 
incentive to increase built-in durability in order to delay the household’s disposal and 
discount the future payment for the disposal fee. This payment-discounting effect 
12 
 
enhances the household’s willingness to pay for the product. Illegal dumping reduces the 
household’s payment of the disposal fee. This illegal-dumping effect contributes to an 
increase in the household’s willingness to pay for the product.  
 
Proposition 2. The equilibrium profit for the monopolistic producer of durable goods 
under a DF is larger than that under an ADF policy. 
 
A purpose of imposing the disposal fee to the household is to reduce solid waste. A 
rise in the household’s willingness to pay for the product enlarges the consumption. In 
effect, from (14) and (18), 𝑞ଵ஽ி > 𝑞ଵ஺஽ி  always holds and 𝑞ଶ஽ி > 𝑞ଶ஺஽ி  if 𝑇஽ி <
3𝛿𝜏/(2 + 𝛿).  
We assume that the marginal environmental damage is represented by γ >
0  if waste is dumped illegally.10 The social cost of waste under an ADF policy is 
composed of total disposal costs; 
      𝑆𝐶𝑊 ஺஽ி ≡  𝜏(𝐺ଵ஺஽ி + δ𝐺ଶ஺஽ி) ,                                   (20) 
where 𝐺ଵ஺஽ி = (1 − 𝐷஺஽ி)𝑞ଵ஺஽ி  and 𝐺ଶ஺஽ி =  𝐷஺஽ி𝑞ଵ஺஽ி + 𝑞ଶ஺஽ி , which is the 
amount of waste in each period under an ADF policy. Note that 𝜏 is an exogenous 
disposal cost per unit. 
Under a DF policy, the household pays a disposal fee of 𝜏 with probability 𝜃 and 
illegally dumps end-of-life goods with probability (1 − 𝜃). While the economy saves the 
disposal cost for illegally dumped waste, the unlawfully dumped waste causes severe 
damage to the environment.11 Therefore, the social marginal cost of illegal waste is 
assumed to be (𝜏 +  𝛾). Thus, the social cost of waste under a DF policy is 
      𝑆𝐶𝑊஽ி ≡ ൛𝜏 + ൫1 − 𝜃෠൯γൟ(𝐺ଵ஽ி + δ𝐺ଶ஽ி),                           (21) 
where 𝐺ଵ஽ி = (1 − 𝐷஽ி)𝑞ଵ஽ி and 𝐺ଶ஽ி =  𝐷஽ி𝑞ଵ஽ி + 𝑞ଶ஽ி . The following proposition 
indicates that, even if a DF policy brings more durable product, the social cost of waste 
under an DF policy can be larger than that under an ADF policy. 
 
Proposition 3. When the equilibrium built-in durability under an ADF policy is higher 
than that under a DF policy, an ADF policy leads to smaller social costs of waste. Even 
when the equilibrium built-in durability under a DF policy is higher than that under an 
ADF policy and the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is small, a 
                                                   
10 Ino (2007), Brécard (2011), and Holland (2012) adopt the assumption with constant marginal 
environmental damage. We assume that waste generates no external environmental damage if the 
waste is disposed of legally. 
11 Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) mention that legal disposal generally results in less environmental 
damage than illegal dumping. 
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DF policy may entail higher social costs compared with an ADF policy.  
 
From the standpoint of increasing durability, a DF policy can be superior to an ADF 
policy. However, a DF policy leads to unlawful dumping, which has two undesirable 
features. First, illegal waste causes more severe environmental damage than legally 
disposed waste. Second, it may increase the amount of waste generation compared to an 
ADF policy since it increases the household’s expected payment for waste disposal while 
expanding the consumption of durable goods.  
 
6．Conclusion 
This study considers how waste disposal fee collection timing affects the durable 
goods producer’s durability choice and the environment. We compare an ADF policy with 
a DF policy using a durable-goods monopoly model. Under an ADF policy, a rise in the 
disposal fee increases built-in durability, that is, it curbs planned obsolescence, and 
reduces the amount of waste. Under a DF policy, an increase in the disposal fee curbs 
planned obsolescence and improves built-in durability by the payment-discounting effect. 
It also decreases built-in durability and increases waste by the illegal-dumping effect. 
Illegal dumping brings additional marginal environmental damage γ. If the payment-
discounting effect is large and the environmental damage is sufficiently small, there is a 
theoretical possibility that a DF policy makes social cost of waste smaller than an ADF 
policy. However, since a DF policy promotes illegal dumping, to argue institutional merits 
and demerits only by the economic efficiency may not be suitable. Thus, the DF policy 
generates a legal and ethical problem. As shown in this study, the producer that is able to 
choose built-in durability has a strong incentive to lobby for the introduction of a DF 
policy compared with the producer of non-durable goods. The goal of EPR regulations is 
to hold manufacturers liable for end-of-life their products; however, a DF policy might 
not a suitable instrument from the viewpoint of EPR. 
 With our limited knowledge, this study is the first to theoretically consider the 
relationship between the timing of waste disposal fee collection and the producer’s 
decision on built-in durability. However, this study also suffers from some limitations. 
We did not consider other types of EPR-like initiatives, such as take-back programs, 
deposit-refund schemes, and performance standards. These aspects may be included in 
future research.  
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Appendix 
The derivation of (11) 
In stage 4, the Lagrangian for the household’s problem is 
ℒଶ஺஽ி = 𝑥ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ) ቀ𝑎 −
஽௤భା௤మ
ଶ
ቁ + 𝜆஺஽ி(𝑅𝑆 − 𝑥ଶ − 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ − 𝑞ଶ𝑇஺஽ி), 
where 𝜆஺஽ி is the multiplier. The first-order conditions are given by 
      డℒమ
ಲವಷ
డ௫మ
= 1 − 𝜆஺஽ி = 0,                                         (A.1) 
      డℒమ
ಲವಷ
డ௤మ
= 𝑎 − 𝐷𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଶ − 𝜆஺஽ி𝑝ଶ − 𝜆𝑇஺஽ி = 0 and                  (A.2) 
      డℒమ
ಲವಷ
డఒಲವಷ
= 𝑅𝑆 − 𝑥ଶ − 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ − 𝑞ଶ𝑇஺஽ி = 0.                           (A.3) 
From (A1) and (A2), we have the second-period inverse demand function (11). 
 
The derivation of (13) 
In stage 2, the Lagrangian for the household’s problem is 
ℒଵ஺஽ி = 𝑥ଵ + 𝑞ଵ ቀ𝑎 −
௤భ
ଶ
ቁ + δ ቄ𝑥ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ) ቀ𝑎 −
஽௤భା௤మ
ଶ
ቁቅ, 
+𝜇஺஽ி{I − 𝑥ଵ − 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଵ𝑇஺஽ி − 𝛿(𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + 𝑞ଶ𝑇஺஽ி)}, 
where 𝜇஺஽ி is the multiplier. The first-order conditions are given by 
      డℒభ
ಲವಷ
డ௫భ
= 1 − 𝜇஺஽ி = 0,                                         (A.4) 
      డℒభ
ಲವಷ
డ௤భ
= 𝑎 − 𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝐷{𝑎 − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)} − 𝜇஺஽ி𝑝ଵ − 𝜇஺஽ி𝑇஺஽ி = 0 and (A.5) 
      డℒభ
ಲವಷ
డఓಲವಷ
= I − 𝑥ଵ − 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଵ𝑇஺஽ி − 𝛿(𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + 𝑞ଶ𝑇஺஽ி) = 0.       (A.6) 
From (A4) and (A5), we have the first-period inverse function (13). 
 
The derivation of (14) 
In stage 1, the first-order conditions for the monopolistic producer’s profit 
maximization with respect to 𝑞ଵ and 𝐷 are 
     𝑝ଵ஺஽ி +
డ௣భಲವಷ
డ௤భ
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డ௣మಲವಷ
డ௤భ
𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) 
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+ డ௤మ
ಲವಷ(௤భ,஽)
డ௤భ
ቀడ௣భ
ಲವಷ
డ௤మ
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డగమಲವಷ
డ௤మ
ቁ = 0,                 (A7)  
     డ௣భ
ಲವಷ
డ஽
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డ௣మಲವಷ
డ஽
𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) 
+ డ௤మ
ಲವಷ(௤భ,஽)
డ஽
ቀడ௣భ
ಲವಷ
డ௤మ
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డగమಲವಷ
డ௤మ
ቁ = 0.                 (A8)  
Using the envelope theorem and substituting (11), (12) and (13) into (A7) and (A8) yields, 
respectively, 
      𝑎 − 2𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝐷൫𝑎 − 2𝐷𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷)൯ − 𝑇஺஽ி 
−𝛿𝐷𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) +
ଵ
ଶ
𝛿𝐷ଶ𝑞ଵ = 0,       (A9) 
 𝛿൫𝑎 − 2𝐷𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷)൯𝑞ଵ + 𝑇஺஽ி𝑞ଵ 
−𝛿𝑞ଵ𝑞ଶ஺஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) +
ଵ
ଶ
𝛿𝐷𝑞ଵଶ = 0.     (A10) 
From (A9) and (A10), we have the equilibrium (14). 
 
The derivation of (15) 
In stage 4, the Lagrangian for the household’s problem is 
ℒଶ஽ி = 𝑥ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ) ቀ𝑎 −
஽௤భା௤మ
ଶ
ቁ + 𝜆஽ி{𝑅𝑆 − 𝑥ଶ − 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)𝑇஽ி}, 
where 𝜆஽ி is the multiplier. The first-order conditions are given by 
      డℒమ
ವಷ
డ௫మ
= 1 − 𝜆஽ி = 0,                                          (A.11) 
      డℒమ
ವಷ
డ௤మ
= 𝑎 − 𝐷𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଶ − 𝜆஽ி𝑝ଶ − 𝜆஽ி𝑇஽ி = 0                      (A.12) 
      డℒమ
ವಷ
డఒವಷ
= 𝑅𝑆 − 𝑥ଶ − 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)𝑇஽ி = 0.                     (A.13) 
From (A11) and (A12), we have the second-period inverse demand function (15). 
 
The derivation of (17) 
In stage 2, the Lagrangian for the household’s problem is 
ℒଵ஽ி = 𝑥ଵ + 𝑞ଵ ቀ𝑎 −
௤భ
ଶ
ቁ + δ ቄ𝑥ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ஽ி) ቀ𝑎 −
஽௤భା௤మವಷ
ଶ
ቁቅ, 
+𝜇஽ி[I − 𝑥ଵ − 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ − (1 − 𝐷)𝑞ଵ𝑇஽ி − 𝛿{𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)𝑇஽ி}], 
where 𝜇஽ி is the multiplier. The first-order conditions are given by 
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      డℒభ
ವಷ
డ௫మ
= 1 − 𝜇஽ி = 0,                                          (A.14) 
డℒభವಷ
డ௤మ
= 𝑎 − 𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝐷{𝑎 − (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)}   
−𝜇஽ி𝑝ଵ − 𝜇஽ி(1 − 𝐷)𝑇஽ி − 𝜇஽ி𝛿𝐷𝑇஽ி = 0   and           (A15) 
 డℒభ
ವಷ
డఓವಷ
= I − 𝑥ଵ − 𝑝ଵ𝑞ଵ − (1 − 𝐷)𝑞ଵ𝑇஽ி 
−𝛿{𝑥ଶ + 𝑝ଶ𝑞ଶ + (𝐷𝑞ଵ + 𝑞ଶ)𝑇஽ி} = 0.                       (A.16) 
From (A14) and (A15), we have the first-period inverse function (17). 
 
The derivation of (18) 
In stage 1, the first-order conditions for the monopolistic producer’s profit 
maximization with respect to 𝑞ଵ and 𝐷 are 
      𝑝ଵ஽ி +
డ௣భವಷ
డ௤భ
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డ௣మವಷ
డ௤భ
𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) 
+ డ௤మ
ವಷ(௤భ,஽)
డ௤భ
ቀడ௣భ
ವಷ
డ௤మ
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డగమವಷ
డ௤మ
ቁ = 0,                         (A.17) 
      డ௣భ
ವಷ
డ஽
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డ௣మವಷ
డ஽
𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) +
డ௤మವಷ(௤భ,஽)
డ஽
ቀడ௣భ
ವಷ
డ௤మ
𝑞ଵ + 𝛿
డగమವಷ
డ௤మ
ቁ = 0.       (A.18) 
Using the envelope theorem and substituting (15), (16) and (17) into (A17) and (A18) 
yields, respectively, 
      𝑎 − 2𝑞ଵ + 𝛿𝐷൫𝑎 − 2𝐷𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷)൯ − (1 − 𝐷)𝑇஽ி − 𝛿𝐷𝑇஽ி 
−𝛿𝐷𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) +
ଵ
ଶ
𝛿𝐷ଶ𝑞ଵ = 0,       (A19) 
 𝛿൫𝑎 − 2𝐷𝑞ଵ − 𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷)൯𝑞ଵ + (1 − 𝛿)𝑇஽ி𝑞ଵ 
−𝛿𝑞ଵ𝑞ଶ஽ி(𝑞ଵ, 𝐷) +
ଵ
ଶ
𝛿𝐷𝑞ଵଶ = 0.     (A20) 
From (A19) and (A20), we have the equilibrium (18). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From (6), (14) and (18), 
      𝐷஽ி − 𝐷஺஽ி = ସ௑൫்
ವಷ൯
ఋ(௔ି்ವಷ)(௔ିఛ)
,                                (A.21) 
where 𝑋(𝑇஽ி) ≡ {𝑎 − (1 − 𝛿)𝜏}𝑇஽ி − 𝛿𝑎𝜏 . Substituting (10) into X(𝑇஽ி) of (A21) 
yields 
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      𝑋(𝑇஽ி) = த௫(த)
ସி
,                                              (A.22) 
where 𝑥(𝜏) ≡ (1 − 𝛿)τଶ − {𝑎 + 4(1 − 𝛿)𝐹}τ + 4𝑎(1 − 𝛿)𝐹 . The minimum of 𝑥(τ) 
is 𝑥(2𝐹) = 2𝐹{𝑎 − 2𝐹 − 2(𝑎 − 𝐹)𝛿}  in the τ ∈ [0, 𝜏̅] . When 0 < 𝛿 ≤ (𝑎 − 2𝐹)/
2(𝑎 − 𝐹) , 𝑥(𝜏) > 0,  leading to 𝐷஽ி > 𝐷஺஽ி. When (𝑎 − 2𝐹)/2(𝑎 − 𝐹) < 𝛿 ≤ 1 , 
𝑥(𝜏) < 0,  resulting in 𝐷஽ி > 𝐷஺஽ி  for 0 < 𝜏 < ?̂?(𝛿)  and  𝐷஽ி ≤ 𝐷஺஽ி  for 
?̂?(𝛿) ≤ 𝜏 < 𝜏̅, where 
      ?̂?(𝛿) ≡ ௔ାସ(ଵିఋ)ிିඥ௔
మି଼௔(ଵିఋ)(ଵିଶఋ)ிା{ସ(ଵିఋ)ி}మ
ଶ(ଵିఋ)
,                   (A.23) 
which is the smaller solution of the quadratic equation 𝑥(𝜏) = 0. The derivative of 𝑥(𝜏) 
with respect to 𝛿 is 
      డ௫(ఛ) 
డఋ
= −𝜏ଶ − 4(𝑎 − 𝜏)𝐹 < 0.                                  (A.24) 
Therefore, ?̂?(𝛿) is a decreasing function of 𝛿.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From (10), (11), (13) and (14), the equilibrium profit under an ADF policy is 
      Π஺஽ி = ଵ
ସ
(𝑎 − 𝜏)(𝑎 − 𝜏 + 4𝛿𝜏) + ఋ
ସ
(𝑎 − 3𝜏)ଶ.                  (A.25) 
From (15), (17) and (18) , the equilibrium profit under an DF policy is 
      Π஽ி = ଵ
଺ସிమ
(4𝐹𝑎 + 12𝐹𝜏 − 3𝜏ଶ)(4𝐹𝑎 − 4𝐹𝜏 + 𝜏ଶ) 
+ ଵ
଺ସఋிమ
{4𝛿𝐹𝑎 − 8𝐹𝜏 − 4𝛿𝐹𝜏 + (2 + 𝛿)𝜏ଶ}ଶ.                  (A.26) 
The difference between (A25) an (A26) is 
      Π஽ி − Π஺஽ி = ఛ
మ
଺ସఋிమ
𝑍(𝜏) ,                                  (A.27) 
where 𝑍(𝜏) ≡ (4 + δ + 𝛿ଶ)𝜏ଶ − 8(4 + δ + 𝛿ଶ)𝐹𝜏 + 8(1 + 𝛿)𝐹{𝛿𝑎 + 8(1 − 𝛿)𝐹} . 
𝑍(𝜏) is a convex quadratic function and reaches the minimum at 𝜏 = 4𝐹 . However, 
𝑍(2𝐹)   is the minimum value  in the domain of 𝜏   from assumption (19), 
where 
      𝑍(2𝐹) = 4𝐹{2δ(1 + δ)𝑎 + (4 − 3δ − 19δଶ)𝐹} .                    (A28) 
Assumption (19) guarantees 𝑍(2𝐹) > 0. Thus, Π஽ி > Π஺஽ி  always holds.  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
From (14), (18), (20) and (21), the difference between 𝑆𝐶𝑊 ஺஽ி and 𝑆𝐶𝑊஽ி is 
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      𝑆𝐶𝑊஽ி − 𝑆𝐶𝑊 ஺஽ி 
= 𝜏{(𝐺ଵ஽ி + δ𝐺ଶ஽ி) − (𝐺ଵ஺஽ி + δ𝐺ଶ஺஽ி)} + ൫1 − 𝜃෠൯γ(𝐺ଵ஽ி + δ𝐺ଶ஽ி)    
 = ఛ
ଶఋ
𝑌(𝑇஽ி) + ൫1 − 𝜃෠൯γ(𝐺ଵ஽ி + δ𝐺ଶ஽ி),                    (A29) 
where 𝑌(𝑇஽ி) ≡ 𝛿(5 − 𝛿)𝜏 − (𝛿ଶ − 𝛿 + 4)𝑇஽ி. From (A21) and (A29), 𝑋ᇱ(𝑇஽ி) > 0 
and 𝑌ᇱ(𝑇஽ி) < 0.  Fig. A1 depicts 𝑋(𝑇஽ி) and 𝑌(𝑇஽ி).  When 𝑇஽ி = ఋ௔ఛ{௔ି(ଵିఋ)ఛ} ≡
𝑇෠  , 𝑋൫𝑇෠൯ = 0  and 𝑌൫𝑇෠൯ = (ଵିఋ)ఋ{(ଵାఋ)௔ି(ହିఋ)ఛ}ఛ{௔ି(ଵିఋ)ఛ} > 0  for 𝜏 < 𝜏̅ <
௔
ହ
 . When 𝑇஽ி =
ఋ(ହିఋ)ఛ
ఋమିఋାସ
≡ 𝑇ത , 𝑌(𝑇ത) = 0  and X(𝑇ത) = (ଵିఋ)ఋ{(ଵାఋ)௔ି(ହିఋ)ఛ}ఛ
ఋమିఋାସ
> 0  for 𝜏 < 𝜏̅ < ௔
ହ
.  Thus, 
when 𝑇෠ < 𝑇஽ி < 𝑇ത, 𝐷஽ி > 𝐷஺஽ி but 𝑆𝐶𝑊஽ி > 𝑆𝐶𝑊 ஺஽ி even if the environmental 
damage by illegal dumping does not exist, that is, γ = 0. The existence of environmental 
damage would put upward pressure on 𝑆𝐶𝑊஽ி.  Q.E.D. 
Fig. A1 about here 
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Fig. 1. Sequence of events  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Period１ Period 2 
Stage 1: The producer 
chooses its output 
and durability. 
Stage 2: The household 
chooses its consumption. 
The end of period 1: 
The household 
discards the end-of-
life goods legally or 
illegally. The SWM 
sector collects and 
disposes the legally 
collected waste. The 
local government 
detects illegal actions. 
Stage 3: 
The producer chooses its output 
and durability. 
The end of period 2: 
The household 
discards the end-of-
life goods legally or 
illegally. The SWM 
sector collects and 
disposes the legally 
collected waste. The 
local government 
detects illegal actions. 
Stage 4: The household 
chooses its consumption. 
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the equilibrium built-in durability 
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Fig. A1. Illustrative graph regarding proof of proposition 3 
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